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At the time of this writing, a new International Association of Athletics Federations 
regulation preventing women with naturally high testosterone from competing in certain 
international athletics events has reignited the controversy over the male-female distinction in 
sports and its implications on individuals’ right to compete. A recent case filed by runner Caster 
Semenya and Athletics South Africa challenging this regulation before the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport, an arbitral tribunal that adjudicates disputes in international sports, sought to have 
the regulation overturned as discriminatory against women with a genetic intersex condition. 
Drawing on established international arbitration law, international norms in arbitrations, and 
relevant precedent, this Comment explores the evidentiary issues before the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport in Semenya’s challenge. In particular, this Comment argues that, given the high stakes 
of the case as well as the inequity in resources between the parties, the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport should have adopted unconventional rules with respect to the allocation of the burden of 
proof, the requisite standard of proof, and the evaluation of scientific evidence to ensure a fair 
hearing on the matter. The Comment ultimately concludes that the suggested changes are well 
within the discretion and ability of the Court of Arbitration for Sport to implement, slight 
challenges to the adoption of each proposed measure notwithstanding. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1960s, international sports organizations have conducted 
gender testing to police the divide between men’s and women’s competitions.1 
Due to improvements in science and technology, the nature of such testing has 
evolved over the years.2 As international sports organizations have developed a 
greater recognition of the lack of a binary gender classification, regulating bodies 
have likewise walked back from mandatory gender testing.3 Yet this reduction in 
gender testing cannot be seen as a complete victory for those opposed to such 
testing, for the mandatory tests have only been replaced by testing on a case-by-
case basis in some sporting bodies, most notably in the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and in the International Association of Athletics Federations 
(IAAF).4 In particular, new understandings of hyperandrogenism, “a congenital 
disorder [that] leads to elevated levels of testosterone due to an androgen 
insensitivity,”5 has generally led to a greater acceptance of hyperandrogenic 
women,6 or women with biological features more commonly associated with 
masculinity.7 Given this new understanding of intersex conditions, the argument 
for eliminating gender testing based on problematic metrics like testosterone has 
gained much traction in the sporting world and has furthered the controversy 
surrounding the current system of case-by-case testing.8 
Despite advances in biology that cast doubt upon the traditional gender 
divide, the IAAF announced on April 26, 2018 new regulations limiting 
participation of female athletes whose testosterone levels are outside the normal 
female range (as defined by the IAAF’s medical and science experts) in certain 
track events, such as the 400-meter and 1600-meter races.9 Setting the threshold 
                                                 
1  See Maayan Sudai, The Testosterone Rule—Constructing Fairness in Professional Sport, 4 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 
181, 182 (2017). 
2  Erin Elizabeth Berry, Respect for the Fundamental Notion of Fairness of Competition: the IAAF, 
Hyperandrogenism, and Women Athletes, 27 WIS. J. L. GEND. & SOC’Y 207, 212–13 (2012). 
3  Dutee Chand v. Athletics Federation of India (AFI) & The International Association of Athletics 
Foundation (IAAF), CAS 2014/A/3759, ¶¶ 294–95 (July 24, 2015). 
4  Berry, supra note 2, at 208. 
5  Anna Boyd, Back to the Binary: How the Olympics Struggle with Separation of Male and Female, 14 DEPAUL 
J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2018). 
6  See generally Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique of Olympic Rules on Sex and Gender, 31 WIS. J. L. 
GEND. & SOC’Y 29 (2016) (advocating hybrid approaches of uniform gender identity and hormone 
rules in categorizing competitors and suggesting openness to redefining gender norms in 
international sports). 
7  See id. at 53 (defining hyperandrogenism). 
8  See Berry, supra note 2, at 209. 
9  See IAAF Introduces New Eligibility Regulations for Female Classification, IAAF (Apr. 26, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/3CRF-29J4. 
 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 220 Vol. 20 No. 1 
for participation in competition at 5 nanomoles per liter (nmol/L) of testosterone, 
the regulation bans women with 46 XY differences in sexual development (DSDs) 
and thus endogenously, or naturally-occurring, high testosterone levels from 
competing in the named events unless they undergo treatment to lower their 
testosterone levels or choose to participate in men’s competitions.10 
The new regulations come after a similar rule that restricted competition 
participation for women with over 10 nmol/L of testosterone was temporarily 
invalidated by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in July 2015 in Dutee Chand 
v. Athletics Federation of India (AFI) & IAAF.11 CAS temporarily enjoined 
enforcement of the competition ban on the grounds that the IAAF, inter alia, did 
not provide enough evidence that an endogenous testosterone level differential 
resulted in unfair competitive outcomes.12 Because the new regulations supplant 
the policies at issue in the 2015 case, that case is now rendered moot. With respect 
to the latest regulation on women with high testosterone, the IAAF claims to have 
strong evidence supporting its conclusion that high DSDs such as endogenously 
elevated testosterone levels lead to differences in athletic performance, arguably 
providing the necessary justification for the new regulation.13 Although the new 
regulations were scheduled to go into effect on November 1, 2018, South African 
runner Caster Semenya, who has been in the spotlight as a female athlete with 
naturally-elevated testosterone levels, filed a challenge to the regulation before 
CAS in June 2018.14 In light of Semenya’s challenge, the IAAF agreed to suspend 
implementation of the regulation until CAS resolves the matter.15 
From February 18–22, 2019, panelists the Honorable Dr. Annabelle Bennett, 
the Honorable Hugh L. Fraser and Dr. Hans Nater heard Semenya’s challenge to the 
DSD regulations and the IAAF’s response.16 On May 1, 2019, CAS released the 
decision in Semenya’s challenge, dismissing the requests for arbitration because 
Semenya and Athletics South Africa (ASA) were unable to prove the invalidity of 
                                                 
10  See id.; see also CAS, CAS Arbitration: Caster Semenya, Athletics South Africa (ASA) and International 
Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF): Decision, CAS MEDIA RELEASE (May 1, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/B6X5-LAAC [hereinafter 2019 CAS Media Release].  
11  See Chand, supra note 3, at 160. 
12  Chand, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 547–48. 
13  See IAAF, supra note 9; see also Audie Cornish & Katrina Karakazis, IAAF Creates Rule to Ban Women 
with Naturally High Testosterone Levels from Competition, NPR (Apr. 30, 2018), http://perma.cc/E57L-
Y3MH. 
14  See Dan Roe, Caster Semenya’s Pro Eligibility is Still in Question. Here’s Why That’s Total Bullshit, RUNNER’S 
WORLD (Oct. 17, 2018), http://perma.cc/KRW8-SJBM; see also Nick Zaccardi, Caster Semenya on 
New IAAF Rule: ‘Discriminatory, Irrational, Unjustifiable’, NBCSPORTS (June 18, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/7D9N-6MXY. 
15  See Roe, supra note 14. 
16  2019 CAS Media Release, supra note 10.  
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the new DSD regulations.17 Referencing the as-yet unpublicized panel decision, 
the release simply stated that “[t]he Panel found that the DSD Regulations are 
discriminatory but the majority of the Panel found that . . . such discrimination is 
a necessary, reasonable and proportionate means of achieving” fair competition.18 
Although the media release announced the panel’s ultimate conclusion and the 
panel’s own reservations about such an outcome, the statement failed to explain 
the process by which the panel arrived at its decision.19 As of June 3, 2019, 
however, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland temporarily suspended the 
application of the DSD Regulations to Semenya pending further hearing.20  
As a result of the controversy surrounding the IAAF’s new ban and its 
adverse effect on certain female athletes, Semenya’s challenge has been closely 
scrutinized and compared to the 2015 Chand case, in part due to the potential 
ramifications of the outcome of this challenge.21 One resounding allegation 
against the ban is that it discriminates unjustly against a small group of elite female 
athletes on the basis of poor scientific evidence.22 While scholars have commented 
on the discriminatory nature of the new regulation and debated the merits of the 
underlying science,23 procedural issues have largely been overlooked. This 
Comment addresses the problems Semenya’s challenge faced in an arbitral hearing 
before CAS given the framework laid out in Chand. By exploring the generally 
accepted rules of evidence in international arbitration, this Comment argues that 
CAS procedures should have been updated in Semenya’s case—and should be 
updated in future cases—to ensure athletes receive a fair hearing on the merits of 
their claims. The Comment focuses on CAS proceedings not simply because of 
the possibility of a remand of Semenya’s case to CAS, but also because of CAS’s 
history of dealing with such procedural issues and its scope for improvement in 
future cases. 
Section II describes the principal parties involved in this most recent 
challenge and CAS’s role. This Section also touches on CAS procedures in Chand 
and how similar procedural decisions may have affected Semenya’s challenge. 
Section III discusses the current laws governing the taking of evidence in 
international arbitration, and the norms that operate in the absence of codified 
evidentiary laws. Finally, Section IV advances a three-fold argument for a novel 
                                                 
17  Id.  
18  Id.  
19  Id.  
20  See Yomi Kazeem, Caster Semenya can compete again without testosterone-reducing drugs—for now, QUARTZ 
AFRICA (June 4, 2019), http://perma.cc/SP5W-XC8M.  
21  See Roe, supra note 14. 
22  See Jeré Longman, Track’s New Gender Rules Could Exclude Some Female Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 
2018), http://perma.cc/A769-XBD9. 
23  See Roe, supra note 14. 
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CAS procedural approach to high-stakes cases such as those cases effectively 
preventing athletes from international competition. Grounded in examples from 
other international decisions and an evidentiary framework borrowed from 
United States (U.S.) jurisprudence, this Comment argues normatively for the 
following changes to the current arbitration procedures: (1) that the burden of 
proof for the necessity of the ban should be on the regulating entity; (2) that the 
standard for this burden of proof should be to the CAS panel’s comfortable 
satisfaction; and (3) that the CAS panel should use a multifactor framework for 
assessing the quality of the scientific studies and other expert evidence presented 
by the parties. 
II.  SEMENYA, THE IAAF, AND CAS 
A.  The Principal Parties 
Caster Semenya’s story highlights the ongoing nature of the controversy 
surrounding the competition eligibility of athletes with atypical biology. Semenya 
burst onto the international track scene in 2008 with her first gold medal win in 
the 800 meter at the Commonwealth Youth Games.24 She followed up her success 
at the junior level by winning the 800 meter and 1500 meter races at the 2009 
African Junior Championships.25 It was around the time of this initial success that 
word of Semenya being forced to undergo sex testing first leaked.26 The rumored 
result of the sex testing was that Semenya had “the external genitalia of a female, 
but internal testes, instead of ovaries and a uterus,”27 a result that was meant to be 
confidential and which the IAAF did not confirm.28 Although Semenya was 
eventually allowed to retain her medals and cleared to continue competing, the 
controversy surrounding her sex did not end.29 Despite, or perhaps because of, 
Semenya’s tremendous success internationally, including her multiple gold medals 
at the 2016 Rio Olympics, Semenya’s eligibility to race has continued to be a topic 
of conversation throughout her entire career.30 
                                                 
24  Shawn M. Crincoli, You Can Only Race if You Can’t Win? The Curious Cases of Oscar Pistorius & Caster 
Semenya, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 133, 154 (2011). 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at 137, n. 27. 
27  Anna Peterson, But She Doesn’t Run Like A Girl…: The Ethic of Fair Play and the Flexibility of the Binary 
Conception of Sex, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 316 (2010). 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  See Boyd, supra note 5, at 6; Crincoli, supra note 24, at 137–38. See also Peterson, supra note 27, at 
316–17. 
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Partially responsible for this controversy is the IAAF, the governing body 
for international track competitions since 1912.31 One of the world’s largest 
sporting organizations, 32 the IAAF was created to act as the central authority on 
regulating athletics internationally and to serve as the official global 
recordkeeper.33 In keeping with its original purpose, the IAAF enacts policies and 
regulations affecting athletes’ participation in international track and field 
competitions. Due to the IAAF’s role as “the primary regulator of athletics from 
the sub-national level all the way up to the Olympic level,”34 athletes who wish to 
compete internationally arguably have no other recourse but to agree to be bound 
by its rules, including the DSD Regulations now in dispute.35 
When controversies between athletes and the IAAF inevitably arise, CAS 
serves as the forum for such dispute resolution. 36 The IAAF Competition Rules 
state that 
[i]n all CAS appeals involving the IAAF, CAS and the CAS Panel shall be 
bound by the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations. In the case of any 
conflict between CAS rules currently in force and the IAAF Constitution, 
Rules and Regulations, the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations shall 
take precedence.37 
A private governing body, CAS was “designed specifically to adjudicate 
sports-related disputes and is essentially sport’s ultimate umpire,” often handing 
down the final word in such disputes.38 CAS was intended to be “an institution 
capable of achieving the quick, efficient, inexpensive and binding resolution of 
sporting disputes.”39 In this capacity, CAS now “plays a key role within the global 
governance regime for athletics by holding the IAAF accountable in its regulatory 
activities.”40 
Because CAS is a private tribunal, it creates and follows its own procedural 
rules41 rather than formally adopting all of the rules of a particular jurisdiction. 
                                                 
31  Michele Krech, To Be a Woman in the World of Sport: Global Regulation of the Gender Binary in Elite 
Athletics, 35 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 262, 278 (2017). 
32  Id. at 279. 
33  Id. at 278. 
34  Id. 
35  See Longman, supra note 22 (“Female athletes with elevated testosterone levels will essentially face 
a ‘choice of no choice[.]’”). 
36  Rachelle Downie, Improving the Performance of Sport’s Ultimate Umpire: Reforming the Governance of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 315, 317 (2011). 
37  Chand, supra note 3, at ¶ 438. 
38  Downie, supra note 36, at 316. 
39  Id. at 317. 
40  Krech, supra note 31, at 291. 
41  Downie, supra note 36, at 318. 
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The fact that CAS sets its own procedural rules is significant because CAS panels 
often make their own evidentiary rules on a case-by-case basis and are not bound 
by other international laws governing evidentiary issues.42 Currently, CAS panels 
need only follow the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration (Code), and where 
the Code is silent on a relevant evidentiary issue, as it often is, the appointed CAS 
panel resolves the issue.43 In reality, then, as “the supreme forum for international 
sport,”44 a particular CAS panel can adopt evidentiary rules that in turn have wide-
reaching effects on athletes by handing down decisions that substantively affect 
athletes’ rights to compete with little oversight or mechanism for review. 
B.  Relevant CAS Precedents 
Since its inception, CAS has heard cases ranging from Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) disciplinary hearings45 to doping 
violations challenges.46 One of the most relevant precedents for the purposes of 
this Comment is the aforementioned case involving Dutee Chand, an Indian 
sprinter who underwent sex testing in 2014 after “several female athletes attending 
a training camp with Chand apparently expressed concern to the AFI President 
about her ‘masculine’ physique.”47 After a round of testing, “the [Sports Authority 
of India] notified Chand that she would be excluded from the upcoming World 
Junior Championships and would not be eligible for selection to the 
Commonwealth Games because her ‘male hormone’ levels were too high.”48 
Instead of forcibly lowering her testosterone through treatment, Chand decided 
to challenge her participation ban before CAS, alleging that the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations impermissibly discriminated against women with 
naturally high testosterone levels.49 
                                                 
42  Chris Davies, The ‘Comfortable Satisfaction’ Standard of Proof: Applied by the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
in Drug-Related Cases, 14 U. NOTRE DAME AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (CAS “is a non-judicial, 
international body which has made it clear that it does not have to follow the rules of evidence.”). 
43  Anthony Rigozzi & Brianna Quinn, Evidentiary Issues Before CAS, in INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 
AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CAS – 4TH CONFERENCE CAS & SAV/FSA LAUSANNE 2012 1, 3 
(Michele Bernasconi ed., 2014).   
44  Downie, supra note 36, at 317. 
45  Matthew J. Mitten, The Court of Arbitration for Sport and Its Global Jurisprudence: International Legal 
Pluralism in a World Without National Boundaries, 30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 17 n. 84 (2014). 
46  Id. at 21. 
47  Krech, supra note 31, at 272. 
48  Id. at 273. 
49  Id. 
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The CAS panel reached its decision in Chand’s case after three days of 
testimony from sixteen witnesses.50 Throughout the hearing, both parties 
presented evidence in the form of expert testimony in support of their positions.51 
Chand argued that the IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations were unduly 
discriminatory on the basis of sex,52 while the IAAF took the position that such a 
regulation “was justified as a necessary, reasonable, and proportionate means of 
creating a level playing field for female athletes as whole.”53 The panel proceeded 
by first asking each party to lay out their requests regarding the burden and 
standard of proof before holding that the initial burden of proof would be on 
Chand, and the standard of proof would simply be on the balance of 
probabilities.54 Then, each party presented evidence, including multiple experts’ 
testimonies, regarding the acceptability of the science behind the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations.55 After ruling on the procedural elements of the 
arbitration, conducting the taking of evidence, and weighing the substantive 
evidence, the CAS panel determined that “the IAAF did not meet its burden of 
establishing that [the alleged] competitive advantage was of sufficient degree to 
warrant the exclusion of women with testosterone levels higher than 10 
nmol/L,”56 which experts for the IAAF in Chand asserted falls between .1 and 
3.08 nmol/L for female athletes generally.57 However, while the CAS panel did 
enjoin the IAAF from immediately implementing its regulations, it did so 
provisionally, allowing the case to be reheard if the IAAF presented more 
persuasive scientific evidence for the basis of the Regulations within two years of 
the decision.58 Although CAS’s holding in Chand has been mooted by the new 
regulations, this 2015 ruling matters not only because of its impact on Chand’s 
case, but also because it sets persuasive precedent for other CAS cases, most 
recently, Semenya’s latest challenge before the tribunal. 
                                                 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 282–83. 
52  Id. at 273. 
53  Id. at 274 (citing Chand, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 35(f), 230, 500). 
54  Chand, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 442–447. The balance of probabilities standard has been thought of as an 
event having at least a 51% chance of having occurred. See Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 32. 
55  Id. at ¶¶ 451–453. 
56  Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 40. 
57  Chand, supra note 3, at ¶ 189. 
58  Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 40. 
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III.  CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAWS 
AND NORMS 
The outcome of Chand raises questions regarding the procedural decisions 
made by the CAS panel. Specifically, the apparent lack of justification for the 
panel’s conclusions on the proper burden, standard, admissibility, and evaluation 
of proof call into question the panel’s decision-making process. This section 
explores the relevant law that governs international arbitral tribunals generally and 
as applied to CAS, from codifications such as the International Bar Association’s 
(IBA) Rules on the Taking of Evidence or the Swiss Rules of International 
Arbitration, to non-codified norms developed through precedential decisions in 
international adjudications generally. This section concludes that the current state 
of the law gives individual arbitral panels a high level of discretion in developing 
procedural rules for admitting and considering evidence. 
A.  Absence of Binding Arbitral Laws 
Perhaps one of the most notable characteristics of CAS is its lack of guidance 
from substantive law. Currently, CAS is governed by Chapter 12 of the Swiss 
Private International Law Act (PILA), which includes rules for international 
arbitrations in Switzerland,59 such as the rules for arbitrator selection, jurisdiction, 
arbitral choice of law, and the finality of awards.60 However, the Swiss rules as 
codified provide little procedural guidance to CAS panels due to their brevity on 
evidentiary issues. For instance, the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration only 
include three clauses on evidence, none of which considers the quality of evidence, 
and one of which simply states: “The arbitral tribunal shall determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence.”61 Similarly, 
Chapter 12 of the PILA provides scant guidance—indeed, Article 184,  Section 3: 
Taking of Evidence only states that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall itself conduct the 
taking of evidence” and that “the arbitral tribunal may request the assistance of 
the state judge at the seat of the arbitral tribunal.”62 
The lack of firm guidance on evidentiary procedure appears to pervade 
international arbitration in most, if not all, substantive areas,63 and international 
                                                 
59  Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 2. 
60  Chapter 12: International Arbitration, Swiss Private International Law Act [hereinafter Private 
International Law Act] (Switz.). 
61  Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, art. 24 (2012).  
62  Private International Law Act, supra note 60, at art. 184 § 3. 
63  Abhinav Bhushan, Standard and Burden of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration: Is There a Bright 
Line Rule?, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 601, 602 (2014) (“Most major international arbitration 
institutions do not provide for specific evidentiary standards in their rules but do provide for 
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sports arbitrations are no exception. This deference to arbitral tribunal discretion 
on a case-by-case basis is exemplified by the IBA Rules on Evidence, which “are 
a relevant, if not the pre-eminent, body of evidentiary rules in modern arbitral 
practice, even if they are often considered ‘non-binding’ in many instances.”64 As 
the primary standard-setter for evidentiary rules in international disputes, and 
given the lack of procedural guidance and the choice of law provisions in the 
Code, 65 the IBA Rules act as a default for international arbitrations. 66 Ideally, to 
provide greater guidance to international dispute resolution fora, the IBA Rules 
on Evidence would outline a set of rules or standards for international arbitral 
tribunals to consider when various evidentiary questions arise, such as how to 
allocate the burden of proof between parties, or “‘which party has to prove what, 
in order for its case to prevail,’”67 and whether to admit or bar certain types of 
evidence from hearings. However, the IBA Rules do not actually provide much 
guidance for arbitral tribunals on the “burdens or standards of proof and other 
issues such as presumptions or inferences in evidence.”68 For instance, Article 9: 
Disclosure and Admissibility of Evidence of the IBA Rules on Evidence simply 
provides that  
[t]he Arbitral Tribunal shall, at the request of a Party or on its own motion, 
exclude from evidence or production any Document, statement, oral 
testimony or inspection for . . . considerations of procedural economy, 
proportionality, fairness or equality of the Parties that the Arbitral Tribunal 
determines to be compelling.69 
Article 9.3 then goes on to emphasize the arbitral tribunal’s discretion in 
taking fairness and equality into account when making evidentiary rulings,70 
reaffirming the vague standard of fairness to the parties in international arbitration 
without providing more concrete guidance. As such, the IBA Rules on Evidence 
provide insufficient direction to CAS panels by failing to codify specific rules or 
even overarching standards on many facets of evidence consideration. 
                                                 
arbitrators’ discretion.”); see also Jennifer Vanderhart, Gatekeeping: U.S. Litigation vs. Arbitration, 12 
EXPERT WITNESSES 3, 3 (2016). 
64  NATHAN D. O’MALLEY, RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: AN ANNOTATED 
GUIDE 10 (2012). 
65  Court of Arbitration for Sport, Code of Sports-related Arbitration ¶ R44.3 (2019).  
66  O’MALLEY, supra note 64, at 10. 
67  Rompetrol Group N.V. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, ¶ 178 (May 6, 2013). 
68  Kabir A. N. Duggal, Evidentiary Principles in Investor-State Arbitration, 28 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 3, 5 
(2017). 
69  PETER ASHFORD, THE IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: A GUIDE 141 (2013).  
70  Id. at 141–42.  
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Internationally adopted guidelines on the taking of evidence outside of the 
pure international arbitration context are likewise silent on how to allocate the 
burden of proof between parties and the standards of proof to be used in various 
circumstances.71 For instance, “that arbitrators have discretion to determine the 
evidentiary weight of evidence is generally accepted and expressly codified . . . 
in Art. 27(4) of the [United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)] Rules and Art. 24(2) of the Swiss Rules.”72 Further emphasizing 
arbitral tribunal discretion, 
[t]he International Court of Justice has stated that ‘[t]he appraisal of the 
probative value of documents and evidence appertained to the discretionary 
power of the arbitrator is not open to question.’ This discretion provides 
arbitrators with the ability to alter the applicable procedure according to the 
requirements of the subject matter of the dispute.73 
In short, the lack of codified guidance combined with the presumptive 
deference to arbitral discretion can render international arbitration a highly 
unpredictable dispute resolution forum for parties. Absent more formal rules, 
norms developed over the course of different international arbitrations may 
supply panels with further guidance. 
B.  International Arbitration Norms on the Burden of Proof 
While one may expect that the lack of a strong legal framework in the IBA 
Rules on Evidence would create many challenges for independent arbitral 
tribunals such as CAS, the loose framework does provide some benefits. The 
greatest advantage of having so much flexibility is that parties can then operate 
within this framework to argue for a different burden or standard of proof. In 
fact, the lack of a strong framework has led to the establishment of a number of 
norms regarding the burden of proof in international arbitration. Examples from 
various international dispute resolution fora, including CAS itself, highlight how 
values such as party consensus and fairness generated norms regarding burden of 
proof. 
One such norm is that evidentiary issues are often decided by the parties 
themselves as long as norms of procedural fairness are adhered to, in keeping with 
the idea of party autonomy.74 Because parties have so much say in determining 
                                                 
71  Bhushan, supra note 63, at 604 (“There are few institutional rules that address the issue of burden 
of proof.”) 
72  TOBIAS ZUBERBÜHLER ET AL., IBA RULES OF EVIDENCE COMMENTARY ON THE IBA RULES ON THE 
TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 167 (2012) (emphasis in original). 
73  Bhushan, supra note 63, at 602 (citing Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of 
Spain on Dec. 23, 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 192, 215–216 (Nov. 18)). 
74  Bhushan, supra note 63, at 601. See also Francisco Blavi & Gonzalo Vial, The Burden of Proof in 
International Commercial Arbitration: Are We Allowed to Adjust the Scales, 39 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
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how an arbitral panel will consider evidence, parties wishing to establish a 
particular evidentiary rule can argue “that a specific procedural agreement entered 
into by the parties should prevail over the general procedural agreement . . . Any 
such specific agreement should always prevail, unless it is not consistent with what 
one could call the ‘mandatory procedural rules’ contained in the Code,”75 which 
would rarely be the case, given the Code’s silence on the burdens and standards 
of proof. 
Another very important international arbitration norm that has developed is 
the generally accepted principle that “the burden of proving the existence of an 
alleged fact shall rest on the person who derives rights from that fact.”76 This 
principle originates from the phrase onus probandi actori incumbit, which roughly 
translates to “the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff,” where plaintiff does not 
“mean the plaintiff from the procedural standpoint, but the real claimant in view 
of the issues involved.”77 In other words, “each party has to prove the facts on 
which it relies to support its case,”78 and that may not necessarily be the party 
bringing the case. There are a number of policy justifications for such an allocation 
of the burden of proof, such as the fact that it is often “difficult to distinguish 
between parties as claimant and respondent in international procedure,” and “[i]t 
is the duty of the parties to co-operate [sic] with international tribunals so as to 
establish the truth of a case.”79 
International tribunals tend to adopt rules that track the principle of having 
each party prove the facts upon which they rely. For instance, Article 19 of the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) International Rules requires each party 
to prove the facts that party relies upon. Article 24(1) of the UNCITRAL requires 
the same.80 Similarly, “tribunals in [International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)] 
                                                 
L. REV. 41, 54 (2016) (“[W]hat seems to be undisputed is that the rules governing the arbitration 
depend primarily on the parties’ agreement, and therefore, special deference shall be given to their 
decisions regarding different procedural and substantive issues, which includes the burden of 
proof.”). 
75  Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 3. 
76  Id. at 15, quoting Schweizerisches Zicilgesetzbuch [ZGB], Code Civil [CC], Codice Civile [CC] [Civil 
Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 8 (Switz.). 
77  O’Malley, supra note 64, at 197–98 (citing Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. The Republic of Sri 
Lanka, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 27 June 1990 in Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB., vol. 
XVII 121 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1992). 
78  Blavi & Vial, supra note 74, at 44 (describing the general rule in international commercial arbitration, 
which can be generalized to other dispute resolution fora). 
79  Duggal, supra note 68, at 38. 
80  Bhushan, supra note 63, at 604. 
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arbitration cases also routinely hold that each party must prove the facts on which 
it relies in support of its claims and defenses[.]”81 
International judgments, both arbitral and non-arbitral, have accordingly 
assigned the burden of proof to the claimant asserting a fact. In U.S.—Measures 
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India,82 the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Appellate Body stated “that the burden of proof rests upon 
the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a 
particular claim or defence.”83 In that case, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s 
decision to allocate to India the burden of proof regarding its claims, and to 
require the U.S. to rebut the presumption if India met its initial burden.84 In a case 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the court had to decide whether 
the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in Cambodia or Thailand, and therefore 
which sovereign had the right to occupy the area.85 Part of the ICJ’s decision 
hinged on the burden of proof for each of the parties, on which the court noted, 
“[b]oth Cambodia and Thailand base their respective claims on a series of facts 
and contentions which are asserted or put forward by one Party or the other. The 
burden of proof in respect of these will of course lie on the Party asserting them 
or putting them forward.”86 All of this is to say that, even in different contexts in 
international adjudication, tribunals have adhered to the maxim that each party 
bears the burden of proving the facts it asserts. 
Combining this shared burden of proof with the wide discretion given to 
arbitrators, an international arbitral panel “may, as influenced by the logical 
sequence of facts involved in a claim or as imposed by the substantive law or other 
circumstances of the case, allocate to one side or the other the risk of not 
producing the evidence in support of their case.”87 Arbitral tribunals have thus 
been known to re-allocate the burden of proof to the responding party when a 
claimant has established prima facie the truth of its claims.88 
                                                 
81  Andrea J. Menaker & Brody K. Greenwald, Proving Corruption in International Arbitration Who Has the 
Burden and How Can it be Met?, in ADDRESSING ISSUES OF CORRUPTION IN COMMERCIAL AND 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 77-102, 80 (Domitille Baizeau & Richard Kreindler eds., 2015). 
82  Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 14, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R (adopted Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Measures Affecting Imports of 
Woven Wool Shirts]. 
83  Duggal, supra note 68, at 39 (quoting Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts). 
84  See Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 82, at 12–14. 
85  See Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits, Judgment, 1962 
I.C.J. Rep. 6, 15–16 (June 15) [hereinafter Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear]. 
86  Id. at 16.  
87  O’MALLEY, supra note 64, at 205. 
88  Angeliki K. Rousaki, Corruption in International Commercial Arbitration, 20 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L 
COM. LAW & ARB. 29, 34–35 (2016) (“It has been asserted that in cases where prima facie evidence 
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Notably, the CAS panel in Chand adopted a variant of the shifting standard 
of proof: 
During the course of the hearing, the Panel requested the parties to set out 
their position concerning the burden and standard of proof. The parties 
agreed that the Athlete bore the burden of proving that the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations are invalid. The parties also agreed that, once 
a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden shifts to the party 
responsible for the discriminating measure to justify the discriminatory 
effect.89 
In sum, while the 2015 Chand panel appeared to shift the burden of proof 
by adopting the position that Chand need only establish, prima facie, that there was 
a discriminatory effect, it still found that the competing evidence “as to whether 
endogenous and exogenous testosterone have the same or different effects on the 
body did not enable the Panel to draw a conclusion one way or the other.”90 But 
the panel did definitively say that Chand bore the onus of showing “that the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations [were] unsupported by, or not based on, scientific 
data and that a difference does exist between the effects of endogenous and 
exogenous testosterone” and that she failed to meet the onus of the burden of 
proof.91 Such a determination appears to support the position that, although the 
panel facially stated that the burden of proof would shift to the IAAF to establish 
that the Regulations are justifiable as reasonable and proportionate after Chand 
made a prima facie showing of discrimination,92 in fact Chand bore the burden of 
proof of her claims. This case accordingly suggests that some instances of burden 
of proof shifts are not as complete as panel decisions would make them appear. 
One salient example in international arbitration in which the burden of proof 
is actually shifted is in cases of alleged doping violations before CAS. In recent 
doping cases, CAS and other tribunals have shifted the burden of proof to the 
anti-doping organization, even when the athlete is the party filing suit, due to the 
punitive nature of such anti-doping findings. In fact, in a rare instance of 
codification of the burden of proof in international law, Article 3.1 of the 2009 
World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) provides that “[t]he Anti-Doping 
Organization shall have the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule 
violation has occurred.”93 Courts hearing challenges to doping sanctions have 
applied this shifted burden of proof to the responding party, particularly when an 
                                                 
of corruption exists, the burden of proof should be shifted to the suspected party . . . in some cases 
arbitral tribunals seem to have engaged this practice.”). 
89  Chand, supra note 3, at ¶ 441. 
90  Id. at ¶ 488. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. at ¶ 443. 
93  Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 16. 
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anti-doping allegation is based on circumstantial evidence.94 For example, in 
USADA v. Collins,95 the [North American Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel] 
required the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the athlete used a prohibited substance or technique.96 The takeaway 
from the example of doping is simply that, when the stakes are high and evidence 
relevant to the merits of the claims are in the hands of the respondent, not the 
initial claimant, shifting the burden of proof to the respondent party (which also 
happens to be the regulating body) can help achieve the norms of fairness and 
equality as outlined by the IBA.97 
C. International Arbitration Norms on the Standard of Proof 
In addition to deciding how to allocate the burden of proof between parties, 
courts in international arbitration must also establish the standard of proof, which 
“defines how much evidence is needed to establish either an individual issue or 
the party’s case as a whole.”98 The most relevant norm in this context consists of 
the standard of proof that is most often applied in substantively similar cases. As 
Professor Antonio Rigozzi and Brianna Quinn assert, in international sports law, 
the familiar balance of probabilities standard is typical for civil proceedings, while 
a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is applied for criminal proceedings.99 
Additional standards include: 
a) ‘Comfortable satisfaction’ – a standard of proof that is stated to be lower 
than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, but higher than the 
civil standard of balance of probabilities; 
b) ‘Personal conviction’ – most akin to comfortable satisfaction and found in 
[Article] 97 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code; and 
                                                 
94  Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive & Circumstantial Evidence Cases in Sports, 
16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 193, 194 (2006) (describing different standards of proof and 
circumstantial evidence used in various example cases). 
95  USADA v. Collins, AAA No. 30 190 00658 04 (Dec. 2004). 
96  McLaren, supra note 94, at 198 (citing USADA v. Collins). 
97  See, for example, in the international human rights context, Gómez-Palomino v. Peru, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136, ¶ 106 (Nov. 22, 2005) 
(pointing out “that forced disappearance . . . requires the State to comply with its international 
obligations in good faith and to provide all necessary information . . . Consequently, any attempt to 
shift the burden of proof to the victims or their next of kin is contrary to [the international 
obligations imposed upon the State]”). 
98  Menaker & Greenwald, supra note 81, at 78 (quoting Rompetrol Group N.V. v Romania). 
99  Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 26. 
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c) ‘Preponderance of the evidence’ – akin to the balance of probabilities and 
featured in Section 3(G)(a) of the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption 
Program.100 
Given the civil law nature of many cases and the discretion afforded to 
panels to apply a particular standard of proof, the default standard of proof in 
most disputes in international arbitration is currently the balance of 
probabilities.101 
However, international sports law has generally differed from international 
arbitration law in the sense that it is more willing to deviate from the balance of 
probabilities standard because “the comfortable satisfaction standard of proof 
works very well for sport, particularly as it is clearly defined and then applied in a 
consistent manner.”102 Practically speaking, a comfortable satisfaction standard 
requires the bearer of the burden of proof to present a stronger case than it would 
have had to if the standard was the balance of probabilities. 103 In fact, CAS has 
broken from international legal tradition by often requiring one standard of proof 
for the sporting organization, and a lower one for the athlete.104 
This international sports law norm has developed perhaps as a response to 
the overarching norm of requiring a heightened standard of proof under qualifying 
circumstances. “[F]or matters that have serious implications for a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction[] or are quasi-criminal in nature (e.g., allegations of fraud, corruption 
etc.) or if the arbitration rules specif[y] a heightened standard, tribunals have 
applied a heightened standard of proof.”105 In particular, CAS panels have adopted 
the comfortable satisfaction standard, which is commonly used in the 
international sports arbitration context, 106 when confronted with “cases involving 
personal reputation and professional misconduct.”107 For instance, in N., J., Y., 
W. v. FINA,108 the second case in which a standard of comfortable satisfaction 
was applied, the panel noted that “a lower standard of proof than is required in a 
                                                 
100  Id. 
101  Duggal, supra note 68, at 42–43. 
102  Davies, supra note 42, at 22. 
103  See Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 26. 
104  See id. at 15–16. 
105  Duggal, supra note 68, at 42. See also Davies, supra note 42, at 4 (highlighting the Briginshaw test, 
which established that “that the more serious the allegation and its consequences, the higher the 
level of proof required for a matter to be substantiated. The standard is not beyond reasonable 
doubt, but the more serious the allegation, the more persuasive the proof must be.”). 
106  Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 27. 
107  Peter Charlish, The Biological Passport: Closing the Net on Doping, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 61, 66 
(2011). 
108  Award, CAS Case No. 1998/A/208 22 December 1998, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000, 
234 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002). 
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criminal case is appropriate in doping cases . . . because disciplinary cases are not 
of a criminal nature. Rather, according to the panel, disciplinary cases are of a 
private law of association nature.”109 
Again, athlete challenges to doping sanctions provide a robust example. In 
addition to allocating the burden of proof to the anti-doping agency, Article 3.1 
of the WADC states that “[t]he standard of proof shall be whether the Anti-
Doping Organization has established an anti-doping rule violation to the comfortable 
satisfaction of the hearing body, bearing mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made.”110 
The subsequent adoption of the WADC by international sports federations such 
as the IAAF has normalized this heightened standard of proof in doping cases.111 
The application of the comfortable satisfaction standard has grown such that a 
2014 CAS media release noted that the standard of comfortable satisfaction was 
a constant across decisions for over thirty athletes in anti-doping cases.112 One 
justification for this widespread use of a heightened standard of proof in doping 
challenges is due to “the gravity of the allegations . . . [in which] [t]he only thing 
that can be said for certain is that a higher standard of proof will be required in 
these cases.”113 Interestingly, the international sporting community accepts this 
heightened standard of proof in cases where the challenged sanction is a two-year-
long ineligibility, leading one to believe that CAS would have no problem applying 
the comfortable satisfaction standard where the ineligibility period is much longer, 
as in Semenya’s case.114 
Doping challenges are not the only cases in which CAS has applied the 
standard of comfortable satisfaction. For example, “[w]ith respect to FIFA 
disciplinary proceedings, CAS has also found the standard of comfortable 
satisfaction to be applicable on the basis of the wording in Article 97 of the FIFA 
Disciplinary Code (FIFA DC),”115 particularly in quasi-criminal contexts. In the 
alleged bribery case of Bin Hammam v. FIFA,116 the CAS panel applied a standard 
of comfortable satisfaction when considering Mr. Bin Hammam’s appeal of his 
                                                 
109  Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for Sport Can 
Do its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1268 (2005). 
110  World Anti-Doping Code, art. 3.1 (2015) (emphasis added).  
111  Id. 
112  CAS, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Delivers Two Reasoned Awards in the Matter of 39 Russian 
Athletes VS/ The IOC, CAS MEDIA RELEASE (Apr. 23, 2018), http://perma.cc/XFM9-DHHP. 
113  McLaren, supra note 94, at 212. 
114  See id. 
115  Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 29. 
116  CAS 2011/A/2625 (July 19, 2012). 
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“lifetime ban from the [FIFA] for allegedly offering bribes to buy votes in a FIFA 
election” for FIFA President.117 The CAS panel in this case 
overturned FIFA’s lifetime ban, even though it found ‘it to be more likely 
than not that Mr[.] Bin Hammam was the source of the money,’ [because of 
its conclusion that the evidence] does not permit the majority of the Panel to 
reach the standard of comfortable satisfaction in relation to the matters on 
which [Mr. Bin Hammam] was charged.118 
The Bin Hammam case thus provides another example of when CAS has 
chosen to apply a heightened standard of proof: the standard of comfortable 
satisfaction was required because this was a case in which the sporting 
organization abridged an individual’s right to participate in a sporting activity. 
D.  International Arbitration Norms on the Evaluation of 
Evidence 
Just as codified international law on arbitration proceedings does not supply 
much guidance on applications of the burden and standard of proof, it also fails 
to shed much light on the admissibility and evaluation of evidence before a 
tribunal,119 especially for the type of scientific evidence relevant to cases like 
Semenya’s. First, with respect to admissibility of evidence, “both Article 184(1) 
PILA and 9(1) of the IBA Rules support the ability of the arbitrators to decide 
whether or not a given piece of evidence is admissible, with Article 9(1) specifically 
providing that the ‘Arbitral Tribunal shall determine the admissibility . . . of 
evidence.’”120 Even with an entire article devoted to the “Admissibility and 
Assessment of Evidence,” the IBA Rules on Evidence primarily focus on 
production issues, such as protecting privileged and confidential documents, but 
not necessarily the evaluation of evidence.121 Rather, Article 9(1) reflects the 
general tone of allowing the arbitral tribunal determine the evidentiary rules 
according to the panel’s best judgment in keeping with “considerations of 
procedural economy, proportionality, fairness or equality of the Parties.”122 
Further, in international sports, “[t]here is no rule in CAS Code to define what 
may, or may not, be admitted in terms of evidence.”123 
                                                 
117  Menaker & Greenwald, supra note 81, at 86. 
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International law outside of the sporting arbitration context likewise 
provides little guidance on the evaluation of evidence. Whereas the IBA Rules on 
Evidence at least dictate overarching principles arbitrators should adhere to when 
admitting evidence and hearing expert testimony, the Rules are largely silent on 
how an arbitral panel should evaluate that evidence.124 Similarly, the WTO 
Appellate Body provides only cursory guiding principles, mandating that panels 
“must ‘verify that the scientific basis comes from a respected and qualified 
source,’” and that “‘the views must be considered to be legitimate science 
according to the standards of the relevant scientific community,’”125 but does not 
detail specifics on how panels should weigh and consider such evidence. In fact, 
the dearth of guidance on evaluating evidence has led commentators to conclude 
that “[t]here is no steadfast rule determining what kind of evidence must be 
considered of higher or of better quality per se.”126 
Since arbitrators rely on their discretion to determine the rules in their 
proceedings, some commentators have argued that arbitrators should explain: 
the type of proof they are looking for and whether proof rendered by the 
parties is sufficient or not; 
their level of satisfaction from the proof provided by the parties and whether 
they will draw an adverse inference, if one party does not submit a certain 
type of proof, requested by the arbitrators; 
the methodology by which they will evaluate evidence.127 
The above framework is particularly informative for CAS, for “each CAS 
panel has the freedom to decide the evidentiary weight of any evidence on the 
record unless such freedom is limited in the relevant regulations.”128 Because 
“[t]he CAS Panel also has the freedom to choose between contradictory elements 
of evidence in the decision-making process,”129 it is important for the arbitrators 
to fully detail their evidentiary procedures in fairness to the parties. Thus, the fact 
that international arbitrators are accorded high discretion and deference in 
determining the rules of evidence in their respective proceedings need not be a 
detriment to fairness to the parties; rather, it can be an avenue for furthering 
justice by providing maximal flexibility for each panel to adapt to the needs of its 
current case. 
                                                 
124  See generally ASHFORD, supra note 69; ZUBERBÜHLER ET AL., supra note 72. 
125  Appellate Body Reports, U.S. – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones 
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The 2015 Chand case put the need for greater guidance on the admissibility 
and evaluation of evidence on stark display. In Chand, the CAS panel confronted 
what can only be described as a confusing array of scientific opinions. For 
instance, Professor Richard Holt, an expert testifying for Chand, explained that in 
his opinion, 
the Hyperandrogenism Regulations [were] ‘scientifically unsound.’ Professor 
Holt identified two scientific flaws in the assumption that elevated 
endogenous testosterone in female athletes confers a competitive advantage. 
First, endogenous testosterone does not explain the difference between male 
and female athletic performance. Second, there is no convincing evidence that 
endogenous testosterone enhances athletic performance in female athletes, 
including those with hyperandrogenism.130 
Another expert for Chand, Dr. Sari van Anders, stated that “the existing 
scientific research does not establish that endogenous testosterone is the basis for 
successful athletic performance.”131 During the hearing, even the IAAF’s experts 
“agreed that, ‘we don’t have much evidence’ and there was no ‘definitive proof’ 
of the link [between testosterone levels and elevated athletic performance in 
women],” but opined that the “available science suggests that testosterone is ‘the 
most important factor’ that could explain the difference.”132 Further, the Chand 
panel had to grapple with direct versus indirect evidence, as another of the experts, 
Dr. Stéphane Bermon, “accepted that the evidence was indirect and said that it 
was not possible to obtain direct evidence”133 on the effect of elevated 
testosterone levels on athletic performance. The barrage of conflicting scientific 
evidence caused the panel to ultimately defer on a final decision, asking the IAAF 
to present more concrete evidence on the necessity of the Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations. Without a clearer standard for admitting and evaluating scientific 
evidence, however, subsequent CAS panels hearing similar issues may confront 
the same problems as the Chand panel. 
IV.  CAS PROCEEDINGS THEN AND NOW: AN ARGUMENT FOR 
CHANGES TO THE EVIDENTIARY RULES 
Having discussed the contours of international law governing international 
arbitral tribunals in general, this Comment now turns to Semenya’s challenge of 
the new IAAF regulation barring women with testosterone levels above 5 nmol/L 
from certain international competition track and field events.134 While the 
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arguments against the new regulation range from gender discrimination (there is 
no comparable ban for male athletes with atypical testosterone levels) to potential 
racial discrimination (many women with elevated levels of testosterone come 
“from developing nations who do not conform to Western standards of 
femininity”135), this Comment focuses on the fairness of the CAS proceeding 
itself. As the sections below demonstrate, the CAS panel in the Chand case, which 
was the last panel to have considered a challenge to a similar ban, did not establish 
evidentiary rules that reflected the parties’ relative access to the requisite evidence. 
Further, based on the limited information in CAS’s media release on the outcome 
of Semenya’s case, the most recent official publication on the decision as this 
Comment goes to press, the proceedings in Semenya’s case did not substantially 
differ from those in Chand.136 Because the media release did not expound further 
on the procedural aspects of the case,137 this Comment assumes that the panel did 
not deviate from the proceedings laid out in Chand. In light of this reality, this 
Comment argues that the Semenya panel should have: (1) shifted the burden of 
proof onto the regulating body; (2) applied a heightened standard of proof of 
comfortable satisfaction, rather than balance of probabilities, due to the high-
stakes nature of such cases; and (3) adopted a Daubert-like standard for evaluating 
scientific evidence, particularly scientific studies.138 
A.  CAS Should Have Shifted the Burden of Proof to Regulating 
Bodies 
As mentioned in Section III, the lack of binding authority on most 
international arbitral tribunals has led to the development of a number of norms 
governing the allocation of the burden of proof. Perhaps the most notable of these 
norms is that tribunals elect to shift the burden of proof to the party that asserts 
a fact under certain circumstances. Such a nonbinding legal framework affords 
international tribunals great latitude in adjusting to the circumstances of each case. 
For many cases in international arbitration, the claimant and the respondent 
appear to have high parity in resources and access to information (as in arbitration 
between sovereign nations, for example).139 However, this parity of power is 
unlikely to exist in many cases before CAS, because CAS serves as the tribunal for 
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managing disputes between athletes and the international federations governing 
sports. Therefore, in order to adhere to the overarching principles of fairness to 
the parties as well as procedural economy, CAS should exercise its discretion in 
employing a particular burden of proof allocation for cases that involve limitations 
on individuals’ right to participate in international sporting events. 
First, CAS should consider procedural fairness when assigning the burden 
of proof between parties. The IBA Rules on Evidence repeatedly reaffirm the idea 
that the taking of evidence should be conducted with “an efficient, economical 
and fair process”140 in mind. While this wording can be construed to speak 
primarily to the time and money spent on the arbitrations, it also reminds arbitral 
tribunals that, fundamentally, all parties deserve a fair hearing, for “[i]t is axiomatic 
that a party who is not afforded a fair opportunity to present its evidence will not 
have been afforded due process.”141 Further, it has been noted that, “[t]o provide 
procedural fairness and substantive justice, a private legal system for resolving 
Olympic and international sports disputes must have, at a minimum . . . a full and 
fair opportunity for all parties to be heard.”142  
Given this norm of procedural fairness to the parties, Semenya should have 
submitted, and the panel should have considered and accepted, an argument that 
the IAAF bears the burden of definitively demonstrating that women with 
testosterone levels above 5 nmol/L have an unacceptable advantage over other 
women in athletic competition because the IAAF is the party moving to infringe 
on Semenya’s human right to compete.143 Whether it is proving that women with 
such testosterone levels do possess a notable, unacceptable advantage, or that the 
regulation as written is reasonable and proportionate, the IAAF should carry the 
burden of proof. It would have been unfair for Semenya to bear the onus of 
proving the IAAF’s premise false, when in reality the IAAF was the party that had 
gone on the offensive and deprived Semenya of her eligibility to compete without 
any wrongdoing on her part.144 One can even favorably compare this to the 
principle that in criminal cases, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving the 
accused guilty, because the prosecutor is asserting a fact which, if true, would 
deprive the defendant of his or her human right to liberty.145 
                                                 
140  IBA, IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, art. 2.1 (May 29, 2010) [hereinafter 
IBA Rules]. 
141  O’MALLEY, supra note 64, at 5. 
142  Mitten, supra note 45, at 20. 
143  Peterson, supra note 27, at 329. 
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145  See Menaker & Greenwald, supra note 81, at 85. 
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Another argument in favor of shifting the burden of proof to preserve 
procedural fairness is related to the clear information asymmetry between 
Semenya and the IAAF. When it announced the new DSD Regulations, the IAAF 
asserted that its regulation was grounded in “a decade and more of research.”146 
The IAAF’s apparent possession of a wealth of research actually cuts in favor of 
shifting the burden of proof, as it proves that the IAAF had the resources to 
defend its assertion that allowing women with naturally high testosterone levels to 
compete alongside women who have “normal” ranges of testosterone results in 
unfair competition.147 Further, the fact that scientists are often commissioned by 
sports regulating bodies increases the risk that the scientific studies conducted will 
be skewed in favor of the regulating organizations’ viewpoint.148 Here, since the 
IAAF commissioned the study, those conducting the study likely had a conflict of 
interest resulting in a non-neutral study. Add on the fact that the hearing before 
CAS had been expedited in this case, effectively preventing Semenya from 
commissioning robust studies of her own to refute the IAAF’s presentation of 
evidence, even assuming she had the resources to do so, and the inequity between 
the parties becomes even more striking. In light of this egregious imbalance in 
access to evidence regarding the effect of endogenous testosterone levels on fair 
competition, combined with the fact that the IAAF is the party moving to abridge 
the rights of a class of individuals, the case for a shifted burden of proof was 
urgently compelling. 
One challenge to this approach is that CAS has not applied such a shift in 
the most relevant, though non-binding, precedent. In its decision in Chand, that 
CAS panel noted that Chand initially “suggested that IAAF bore the burden of 
establishing the scientific basis of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations to the 
comfortable satisfaction of the Panel . . . [but] appeared to resile [sic] from that 
position during the hearing by expressly accepting that Athlete bears the burden 
of proof on the issue of scientific basis.”149 While it is unclear why Chand changed 
her position, the fact remains that ultimately, despite saying that the burden of 
proof shifted “to the IAAF to establish that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations 
are necessary, reasonable and proportionate for the purposes of establishing a 
level playing field for female athletes,”150 the panel still implied that Chand needed 
                                                 
146  See IAAF, supra note 9. 
147  See Roe, supra note 14.  
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to prove that the available science did not support Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations. Essentially, the CAS panel held that because the parties presented 
competing scientific evidence and the IAAF demonstrated that the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations were based on data available to it, Chand still 
needed to show that the IAAF did not have a proper basis for its Regulation.151 
Ultimately, the CAS panel’s ruling did not clearly assign the burden of proving the 
necessity of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations to the IAAF. Semenya could have 
argued that, by deferring implementation of the 2014 Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations, the CAS panel acknowledged the IAAF’s evidentiary burden when it 
sought to exclude individuals from competition based on a genetically 
predetermined condition. 
Mitigating the challenge presented by the Chand panel’s equivocation on the 
burden of proof, however, is the fact that a shifted burden of proof is not 
unprecedented, even in the limited realm of cases before CAS: the challenges to 
doping violations serve as a comparison point for Semenya. For just as CAS 
sought fit to shift the burden of proof onto the regulating body in doping cases, 
so too should it have done the same in Semenya’s case, where the right to 
participate in international sporting events is similarly, if not more heavily, 
implicated. The argument would have been that the regulating body in this case, 
the IAAF, should bear the burden of proof, since it initiated the limitation on 
participation in international sports. This is akin to the scenario in which the anti-
doping organization that is limiting participation in sports through sanctions on 
the accused athlete must prove the accuracy of its allegations.152 In short, 
persuasive precedent exists for both positions on allocating the burden of proof 
between the two parties. The CAS panel assigned to Semenya’s case should 
accordingly have considered the factors of procedural economy and overarching 
fairness as described above in deciding the appropriate allocation of the burden 
of proof. 
                                                 
151  Id. at ¶ 488. 
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B.  CAS Should Have Applied a Standard of Proof of 
Comfortable Satisfaction, Not Balance of Probabili ties, to 
the Claims Brought by the IAAF 
In the context of selecting a standard of proof, international norms also 
provide arbitral tribunals with great flexibility.153 Panels hearing cases on 
international sports law often apply either the balance of probabilities or the 
comfortable satisfaction standard of proof.154 Regardless of the final allocation of 
the burden of proof, the standard of proof required in cases that implicate an 
athlete’s right to participate in sports or that otherwise involve high stakes 
consequences in the sporting world should be higher than merely “more likely 
than not[.]” In the present case, the CAS panel should only have accepted the 
IAAF’s claim that allowing women with endogenously high testosterone to 
compete would interfere with fair and meaningful competition if it was 
comfortably satisfied that the evidence supported this proposition. 
The argument for adopting such a standard of proof once again relies on the 
fact that this case involves important substantive rights for an entire class of 
athletes. According to the Olympic Charter, National Olympic Committees must 
work to “ensure that no athlete ‘has been excluded for racial, religious or political 
reasons or by reason of other forms of discrimination.’”155 This directive reflects 
the universal value that “[t]he practice of sport is a human right,”156 and there is 
no intelligible reason why other international sporting organizations should not 
be similarly enjoined from discriminatorily excluding an athlete. Recognizing that 
“the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard must be applied with respect to both the 
seriousness of the offence and the type of the offence,”157 CAS panels have 
discretionarily applied this standard in numerous cases. Specifically, the 
comfortable satisfaction standard 
is most commonly applied in disciplinary proceedings, due to the often 
serious repercussions of being found guilty of a relevant offence [because t]he 
use of this standard offers somewhat of a safeguard to the accused, requiring 
the satisfaction of the offence to a higher standard than that typically used in 
civil proceedings.158 
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Once again, challenges to doping violations sanctions prove instructive. 
“The comfortable satisfaction standard is well-established in doping cases, and 
features in various articles in the WADC.”159 For instance, the CAS panels in 
Oliveira v. USADA160 and Querimaj v. IWF,161 cases in which the accused athletes 
had ingested forbidden substances thought to enhance athletic performance, 
applied the standard of comfortable satisfaction and held that the athlete needed 
only prove that “ingestion of [the specified substance] was not intended to 
enhance” athletic performance.162 Likewise, the CAS panel in Veerpalu v. 
International Ski Federation163 “applied the standard of comfortable satisfaction to 
invalidate a regulation for a human growth hormone testing procedure for doping 
cases.”164 Although not every doping challenge before CAS warrants an 
application of the comfortable satisfaction standard,165 such a standard is 
commonly accepted in doping violations challenges because the stakes are high 
for the challenging athlete. Semenya’s case exemplified the scenarios in which a 
comfortable satisfaction standard should apply: were the new DSD Regulations 
to take effect, they would deprive an entire class of athletes from certain 
international sporting events indefinitely, which constitutes a deprivation of an 
individual’s right to participate in sports.166 
The most formidable challenge to raising this argument in Semenya’s case 
was the fact that the closest precedent, Chand, did not apply the standard of 
comfortable satisfaction. In fact, the panel in Chand explicitly considered the 
comfortable satisfaction standard and yet adopted the balance of probabilities 
standard, referencing the Pistorius v. IAAF167 panel. The Pistorius panel “noted that 
the standard of proof is clearly not the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard 
applicable in criminal cases in most jurisdictions.”168 The Chand panel went on to 
reject the comfortable satisfaction standard, although it did mitigate its statements 
by conceding “that the requisite standard to justify discrimination of a 
fundamental right, including the right to compete that is recognised in the 
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Hyperandrogenism Regulations themselves, requires the IAAF to overcome 
positively the onus to establish that justification.”169 
In response to this unfavorable precedent, Semenya should have relied on 
another accepted norm, that “CAS panels are not bound by findings of other 
arbitrators in earlier cases,”170 particularly when a unique set of facts counsels 
against being bound by inapplicable rulings in previous cases. Indeed, one major 
difference between this most recent case and Chand is the fact that this time, the 
new DSD Regulations seem to be targeted, and thus more egregiously 
discriminatory, than the ones at issue in Chand. Specifically, the DSD Regulations 
appear to be directed at Semenya because the restricted events named in the 
regulations range include “400m, hurdles races, 800m, 1500m, one mile races and 
combined events over the same distances,”171 yet the studies purported to justify 
the regulations suggest “that female athletes with higher levels of testosterone had 
an advantage in five events[:] the 400m, 400m hurdles, 800m, hammer throw, and 
pole vault.”172 The discrepancy between the events listed in the study as being 
most susceptible to unfair competition and the events actually restricted by the 
DSD Regulations thus seems “like a very arbitrary and selective way in which to 
apply regulations, and [seems] targeted [toward] Semenya.”173 Indeed, CAS’s 
executive summary of Semenya’s case noted “the paucity of evidence to justify the 
inclusion of” the 1500m and one mile events in the DSD Regulations 
restrictions,174 bolstering the claim that the regulations were not grounded in 
scientifically proven outcomes, but rather were a direct response to Semenya’s 
personal successes. In light of this selective application of the ban, the panel 
should have weighed the higher risk of targeted discrimination in this case in favor 
of applying the higher standard of proof of comfortable satisfaction, especially 
since allegations of discriminatory intent generally warrant greater scrutiny.175 
Finally, in addition to the importance of the rights at stake for athletes who 
wish to compete internationally, the fact that the comfortable satisfaction standard 
has strong persuasive precedent in other cases before CAS, which the Chand panel 
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itself acknowledged, weighed in favor of adopting the comfortable satisfaction 
standard over the balance of probabilities standard. First, the fact that such a 
standard is common in international sports arbitration signifies that CAS 
arbitrators are familiar with applying such a standard and would be able to do so 
effectively. Any argument that requiring a balance of probabilities standard of 
proof would lead to greater procedural economy would therefore not be 
persuasive. More importantly, adopting the comfortable satisfaction standard of 
proof in Semenya’s challenge would have sent a strong message to the 
international sporting community that encroachments on athletes’ rights to 
compete will be scrutinized carefully. By adopting this commonly accepted 
standard, the CAS panel in Semenya’s case would have reaped the benefit of 
institutional knowledge by adhering to both persuasive, if non-binding, CAS 
precedent while also protecting the individual right to compete in athletics by 
attributing due weight to the claims against the ban. 
C. CAS Should Have Adopted the Daubert Standard for 
Considering Scientif ic Evidence 
Another evidentiary issue CAS panels must consider is what evidence to 
admit and how to evaluate the admitted evidence. In this context, again, the lack 
of international guidance allows a panel to decide the most appropriate standards 
on a case-by-case basis.176 The nature of the evidence expected to be presented 
before the panel therefore becomes highly relevant.177 And in Semenya’s case, the 
controversy surrounding the IAAF’s evidence in support of its DSD Regulations 
suggests that evidence was as contradictory evidence as in Chand, which resulted 
in a deferred implementation of the old Hyperandrogenism Regulations until 
more conclusive evidence came to light. The lack of guidance for both current 
and subsequent panels hearing such contradictory evidence rendered the issue ripe 
in Semenya’s case. This Comment suggests the Daubert framework of policing and 
evaluating scientific evidence as a desirable standard for CAS arbitrations. 
1. The Chand decision did not resolve how CAS panels should evaluate 
evidence. 
The Chand panel left many questions unanswered, perhaps the most pressing 
of which was the quality of proof required to justify a ban as necessary, reasonable, 
and proportionate.178 In that case, the panel heard undisputed evidence that there 
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is a “[10–12 percent] difference between elite male and elite female athletic 
performance.”179 The panel held that the IAAF did not meet its burden of 
justifying the then-contemporary ban on women with over 10 nmol/L of 
testosterone from international athletic competition in part because the IAAF did 
not demonstrate a similar differential in athletic performance between women 
with testosterone levels above that cutoff as opposed to below the cutoff, or 
within the “normal” range for women.180 However, the CAS panel did not provide 
more specific guidance on what would qualify as sufficient evidence to justify the 
IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations, for the CAS panel only suggested “that a 
slight advantage such as [one percent] ‘may not justify a separation of athletes 
within the female category, given other relevant variables that legitimately affect 
athletic performance.’”181 
This lack of formal and precedential guidance only punted the problem 
down the road in future cases. In Semenya’s challenge, the inability to define the 
quality of evidence necessary to justify the Regulations created a high level of 
uncertainty for both Semenya and the IAAF, particularly since the scientific 
studies presented by the IAAF were already being challenged in the scientific 
community before the CAS proceedings began. For instance, 
[c]ritics [of the new DSD Regulations] say IAAF researchers Stéphane 
Bermon and Pierre-Yves Garnier (who was sanctioned for interfering with an 
IAAF ethics investigation last year) essentially re-ran the statistical analyses 
on the same data [from Chand] until they produced a different conclusion. 
But three independent researchers—Roger Pielke of the University of 
Colorado-Boulder, Ross Tucker of the University of Cape Town, and Erik 
Boye of Oslo University Hospital—couldn’t reproduce Bermon’s and 
Garnier’s analyses with publicly available data.182 
If the IAAF merely presented a re-run of the studies used to justify the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations at issue in Chand’s case, and those studies were 
clearly insufficient to justify that ban,183 then the case for adopting a clear 
framework for evaluating the disputed evidence in future cases is even stronger. 
2. The Semenya panel should have considered adopting the Daubert 
standard for evaluating scientific evidence. 
In the absence of such guidance from international arbitration law, other 
frameworks could have informed the CAS panel’s decision on how to evaluate 
scientific evidence. One such framework was the Daubert standard from U.S. law, 
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which replaced the relevance and general acceptance standards previously used in 
American courts to evaluate evidence.184 The modern Daubert framework arose 
out of three cases that “clarified and expanded the scope of the [American] 
Federal Rules of Evidence as they apply to expert witnesses.”185 These three cases, 
often known as the Daubert trilogy, stand for the proposition that scientific 
evidence and expert testimony should be scrutinized for both the general 
methodology applied in the study as well as the soundness of the expert’s 
conclusions.186 
First, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 187 the U.S. Supreme Court 
overruled a precedential holding that made general acceptance the test for 
admitting scientific evidence.188 Instead, the Court held that trial judges were to 
be gatekeepers of evidence and were “responsible for ensuring that an expert’s 
testimony was based on a reliable foundation and relevant.”189 In addition to 
overturning the previous standard articulated in Frye v. U.S.,190 “the Court [in 
Daubert] adopted a new framework for evaluating the reliability of scientific 
evidence based on four considerations: falsifiability, peer review, error rates, and 
‘acceptability’ in the relevant scientific community.”191 In essence, the court 
endorsed a multi-factor standard emphasizing “the principles and methodology 
of the scientific proposition and not [ ] the proffered conclusions.”192 
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The second case of the trilogy, General Electric Co. v. Joiner,193 expanded the 
trial judge’s role as the gatekeeper of admissible scientific evidence by applying the 
Daubert factors to a scientific expert’s conclusions as well as methodology. Joiner 
indicated that the trial judge “has the discretion to totally reject and disallow an 
expert’s opinion, even if based on an accepted methodology, if the judge finds 
that the expert’s conclusion is not reliably based on that methodology.”194 And 
finally, the third case in the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,195 
“extended the standards of Daubert to include not only expert testimony about 
matters that are scientific but also expert testimony based on technical and other 
specialized knowledge.”196 
While at first glance the Daubert framework appears to be geared toward the 
American legal system, it can still prove instructive in international arbitration. In 
CAS arbitrations, the panel must act like the American trial judge in that the panel 
must decide what evidence to admit.197 However, the two systems differ in that 
the decision-maker in the American legal system is often a panel of non-expert 
jurors, not the trial judge, whereas in CAS arbitrations, the arbitral tribunal 
evaluates the evidence it admitted.198 The unification of the acts of determining 
admissibility and considering evidence on the merits into one entity in 
international arbitrations renders the Daubert framework unsuitable for structuring 
rules of admissibility in the arbitral hearing, in part because “[n]owhere in 
international arbitration . . . is there a system like that which exists in U.S. 
domestic courts to challenge the admissibility of evidence presented by an 
expert.”199 However, because the Daubert framework was intended to only allow 
reliable, quality evidence to be heard, it still provides ample guidance for 
international arbitrators in the consideration and evaluation of evidence. 
In Semenya’s case, for instance, the IAAF should have been required to 
prove its assertion that endogenously elevated testosterone in females produces 
an unfair athletic advantage.200 To do this, the IAAF should have produced studies 
that isolate endogenous testosterone (as opposed to exogenous testosterone or 
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other factors) as the sole driver of the difference in athletic performance in 
hyperandrogenic women. But because there are so many inputs that result in 
particular levels of athletic performance,201 and attempting to isolate testosterone 
as the driver of such performance “glosses over the fact that innumerable other 
natural and environmental factors contribute to each athlete’s relative advantages 
and disadvantages—from height and lung capacity to coaching and training 
facilities,”202—any study that purports to identify endogenous testosterone as the 
sole cause of such performance levels must be highly scrutinized. To evaluate a 
study claiming to isolate testosterone, the CAS panel could have applied some of 
the Daubert factors by asking whether the study’s conclusion had been tested, 
subjected to peer review, established with an acceptably low error rate, and 
accepted by the scientific community.203 Similarly, the CAS panel could have used 
these factors to test whether other scientific conclusions presented in Semenya’s 
case were sufficiently well-established and reliable to justify upholding the high-
stakes DSD Regulations. 
As with the arguments for a shift in the burden of proof and adoption of a 
comfortable satisfaction standard of proof proposed above, the argument for 
implementing the Daubert framework in CAS proceedings is not without its 
challenges. In addition to the aforementioned limitation that “arbitral proceedings 
[are] more akin to a bench trial than a jury trial,”204 the fact remains that other 
international arbitral tribunals have not appeared to adopt a similar framework for 
admitting and evaluating evidence. However, since “the discretionary power of 
the arbitrator [to appraise evidence] is not open to question,”205 and “the tribunal 
is able to accord its own weight to any evidence presented,”206 a CAS panel 
adopting a clear test for evaluating evidence that it has the discretion to consider 
is hardly objectionable.207 The fact that no comparable framework is currently 
used in international law is not an argument against applying and clarifying such a 
standard now, but rather an argument for doing so. 
It must also be noted that even if the CAS panel failed to adopt a Daubert-
like approach to evaluating evidence, the scientific studies put forth by the IAAF 
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did not even meet the lower general acceptance standard the Daubert trilogy 
replaced, nor the standards from other international dispute resolution fora.208 
The overturned Frye standard simply held that “the thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”209 Meanwhile, the WTO 
Appellate Body, for example, requires scientific evidence to “have the necessary 
scientific and methodological rigour to be considered reputable science.”210 The 
evidence put forth by the IAAF met neither of these standards, for the high level 
of controversy surrounding the scientific evidence and expert testimonies first in 
Chand, and then in Semenya’s case, clearly prevented those “scientific findings 
[from being] ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which [they] belong[].’”211 At a minimum, then, the CAS panel 
in Semenya’s case should have rectified the laxity of the panel in Chand by at least 
vetting the scientific evidence presented against a standard of generally accepted 
methodology. Indeed, the IAAF studies’ failure to meet the lower bar supplied by 
Frye and the WTO Appellate Body rules exemplified the need to implement a 
clarified approach that allows arbitral tribunals to scrutinize evidence carefully, 
especially when important substantive rights are involved. Whether by crafting 
clear standards for evaluating scientific evidence akin to the Daubert standard or 
taking on the more active role of appointing a neutral expert,212 the CAS panel 
should have leveraged its procedural flexibility to ensure that the evidence used to 
substantiate either party’s claims did so reliably.213 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For over 50 years, the international sporting community has struggled with 
notions of fairness when it comes to classifying athletic events on a male-female 
binary. Today, the question remains as unsettled as the first day on which sex-
testing was introduced. In announcing its most recent DSD Regulations, the 
IAAF renewed the controversy over the eligibility of intersex individuals to 
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participate as females in international sporting events, this time with respect to 
one particular athlete: Caster Semenya. The new regulations triggered a case that 
mirrored the 2015 Chand case, which also challenged the Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations then in effect for impermissible discrimination. 
While Chand amounted to a temporary victory for hyperandrogenic women 
in that it stayed the implementation of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations at the 
time, the proceedings left many questions unresolved. Substantively, the Chand 
panel did not reach a conclusion as to whether hyperandrogenic individuals truly 
receive a significant advantage in athletic performance due to their elevated 
testosterone levels. Procedurally, the Chand panel also failed to answer important 
evidentiary questions related in international sports arbitration. Although the 
Chand panel assigned the burden of proof to the IAAF after Chand made a prima 
facie showing that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations were discriminatory, the 
CAS panel still seemed to hold Chand responsible for proving the claims in her 
case, rather than having the IAAF bear the burden. Additionally, the CAS panel 
rejected the comfortable satisfaction standard of proof in favor of the balance of 
probabilities standard of proof following nothing more than a cursory 
consideration of both standards. And finally, although the panel entreated the 
IAAF to bring more evidence demonstrating that endogenously high testosterone 
levels result in unfair competition, it did not specify the strength of the evidence 
needed to uphold the Hyperandrogenism Regulations. 
Given the indeterminacy surrounding the taking of evidence in CAS 
arbitrations, in cases in which athletes’ fundamental right to compete are involved, 
arbitral panels should: shift the burden of proof onto the party abridging those 
rights; employ a standard of proof such that the panel can only accept such an 
abridgement if the panel is comfortably satisfied that the abridgement is justified; 
and set out a clear framework, based on the Daubert standard in U.S. law, for 
evaluating the scientific evidence presented. Although challenges to implementing 
each of these evidentiary standards abound, the lack of binding evidentiary rules 
and natural flexibility of international arbitration law provide the latitude needed 
to adopt the proposed measures. And the interests of the impacted athletes in 
their individual right to participate in sporting events demand it. 
